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I. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DISCOVERS
THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
Twenty-five years after the adoption of the modem Florida Constitu-
tion,' the Florida Supreme Court recognizes the state constitution as a
primary protection of individual rights for people in Florida. In 1989, the
Florida Supreme Court recognized that the state constitution should be
utilized first in an analysis involving assertions about violations of basic
individual rights.' The court prioritized the Florida Constitution over the
United States Constitution.3 First, attomeys and the Florida courts should
look to the Florida Constitution to protect individual rights, and only if the
state constitution fails to protect individual rights should attomeys and the
Florida courts apply the Federal Constitution to the issues involved in any
case.
The Florida Supreme Court joins courts in other states that utilize their
state constitutions as primary protection of individual rights including
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, B.A. Haverford
College, J.D. Boston College Law School.
1. The modem Florida Constitution is the result of major revisions to the 1885
Constitution approved by the Florida electorate in 1968.
2. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d. 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989).
3. Id.
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Oregon,4 New Hampshire,5 New Jersey,6 Washington,7 Texas,8 Michi-
gan, 9 and Vermont."
The Florida Supreme Court signaled strongly that Florida constitutional
practice should reflect the primacy model of constitutional application in
which the state constitution is relied upon first to resolve individual rights
problems." Under the primacy model, state courts avoid utilizing the
Federal Constitution until the state constitution fails to protect an activity
protected by the Federal Constitution.12 State courts that utilize a primacy
approach wean themselves away from relying on the Federal Constitution
as the basic protector of individual rights, thereby avoiding the relegation
of state constitutions to the level of protecting rights only when the Federal
Constitution fails to do so."
The Florida Supreme Court has just begun the process of converting
the Florida Constitution into the primary protection of individual rights. In
1989 and 1990 the court recognized the primary strength and application of
the Florida Constitution, but the court never developed a primacy model in
4. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Or. 1983).
5. See New Hampshire v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983).
6. See New Jersey v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 953 (N.J. 1982).
7. See Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986); Washington v.
Langland, 711 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
8. See Heitman v. Texas, 815 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
9. See Michigan v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1992).
10. See Vermont v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 1985).
11. See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State 's Bills ofRights, 9
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081 (1985).
12. See Robert F. Utter and Sanford E. Pitler, Presentinga State ConstitutionalLaw
Argument: Commenton Theory and Technique,20 IND. L. REV. 635,647-48 (1987); Charles
G. Douglas, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 127, 140-42 (1988); Ronald
K. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of
State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 333-39 (1986);
Stephen F. Aton, State ConstitutionsRealigning Federalism: A Special Look at Florida, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 733, 768-73 (1987).
13. David J. Fine, Project Report: Toward An Activist Role for State Bills of Rights,
8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 286-90 (1973); Wallace P. Carson, "Last Things Last: "A
AethodologicalApproach to Legal Arguments in State Courts, 19 WlLLAMETrE L. REV. 641,
650-52 (1983); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 435-37 (1988); Ronald K. Collins,
Reliance On State Constitutions-Awayfrom a ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1981); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500-02 (1977).
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a meaningful fashion. 4 In 1992, the court finally faced the task of
developing the intricacies of a primacy model,' 5 but the court subsequently
failed to apply its own interpretive methodology forcefully, 6
II. PRIVACY AND THE INITIATION OF PRIMACY
Abortion and death provided the Florida Supreme Court with
opportunities to recognize the primacy application of article I of the Florida
Constitution. In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court in In re T. W 7 recog-
nized the right of a female minor to obtain an abortion without the consent
of the minor's parent. The T. W court struck down a Florida statute that
required minors to obtain parental consent for an abortion, 8 finding that
the statute violated the Florida constitutional privacy provision.19 A year
later, the Florida Supreme Court held in In re Browning that a surrogate for
an incompetent patient suffering from an incurable terminal disease could
order life-prolonging medical procedures withheld from the patient.2" The
surrogate attempted to follow a written directive from the patient requesting
discontinuation of nutrition and hydration provided by medical technological
means.2 The court allowed surrogates for incompetent, terminal patients
to discontinue life prolonging procedures when the patient expressed orally
or by a written directive her or his will to die.22 The Florida Supreme
Court based its decision on the Florida constitutional right to privacy,23 just
as it had done the previous year in T. W
The T. W court adopted a primacy approach for the application of the
Florida Constitution by utilizing a two-step analysis for cases involving a
constitutional issue.24 First, the court examined the parental consent statute
14. See discussion infra part II.
15. See discussion infra part III.
16. See discussion infra part IV.
17. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
19. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1196 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23(1980)). Article I,
section 23 provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
government intrusion into his private life except as provided herein." FLA. CONST. art. I, §
23 (1980).
20. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id. at 10; see also In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
24. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
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in the context of the Florida Constitution.25 If the court had found that the
Florida Constitution faile to protect a minor's fight to choose an abortion
without parental consent, the court would have moved to the second level
of the analysis and applied the Federal Constitution.26 The Browning
opinion followed the lead of the T. W opinion. Although the T W court
explicitly described a primacy approach composed of a two-step, state first,
federal second, constitutional analysis, the Browning court only implicitly
utilized a primacy approach by focusing solely on the state constitutional
fight to privacy as a source of rights protective law. 8
While T. W and Browning utilized the Florida Constitution as the
primary basis for individual rights analysis and protection, neither case
provided any depth into the primacy approach for applying the Florida
Constitution. At best, both cases merely mouthed or pretended a primacy
approach, creating a veneer of importance for the Florida Constitution.
Neither case truly relied on a Florida-based legal analysis. Although T. W
explicitly stated that the parental consent statute would be examined first by
the court under the Florida Constitution, the court actually based its analysis
on an amalgam of federal constitutional legal doctrine and the national
privacy policy.29 The heart of the T. W analysis relied on Roe v. Wade.3"
When the T W court defined the scope of the fight to choose an abortion in
Florida, the court utilized the trimester system developed in Roe.31
In the first pages of the T W opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
outlined the history of federal abortion law relating to minors, describing the
elements of the trimester system.32 When the court finally defined the
scope of Florida law, the court copied the basics of the Roe approach
finding that until the end of the first trimester, women in Florida remain free
to decide whether to abort a fetus free of state restriction.33 After the end
of the first trimester, the State of Florida may impose regulations safeguard-
ing the health of the mother.34 However, when the fetus becomes viable,
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1190, 1196.
27. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
28. Id.
29. See Daniel R. Gordon, One Privacy Provision, Two Privacy Protection: The Right
to Privacy In Florida After Roe v. Wade, 5 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 111-20 (1990).
30. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
32. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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the state may restrict all abortions to protect potential life.35 The Florida
Supreme Court differed with the Roe court on a definition of viability. The
Florida Supreme Court viewed the Roe court as defining viability as the
time at which the fetus becomes capable of meaningful life with artificial
medical aid.36 The T W. court proceeded to define viability as meaningful
life outside the womb through standard medical measures.37 The court
never explained the difference between artificial aid to a fetus and standard
medical procedures for a fetus.38 The court's utilization of Roe to define
abortion rights in Florida occurred in the context of a discussion about
general privacy policy.
The T' W. court set the stage for defining Florida abortion law by
reviewing general privacy policy. Instead of focusing on the importance of
privacy to Floridians and state policy, the T. W court meshed Florida
constitutional doctrine with national privacy norms. The court viewed the
concept of privacy as deeply rooted in the nation's political system and
heritage,39 relying on Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States4" to emphasize the importance of the right to be let alone." The
Florida court observed that a wide scope of federal privacy protection
shields individual autonomy in personal decisions involving marriage,
procreation., contraception, family relations, child rearing and education.42
The T W. court defined the Florida constitutional privacy law43 by quoting
from Professor Larry Tribe's works on national constitutional policy44 and
federal abortion cases such as Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists.4"
The Browning opinion paralleled the T W. opinion. The court in
Browning also asserted that the Florida Constitution provides the basic
individual rights for people within the state.46 The court relied heavily on
the Florida constitutional privacy provision as the primary source of legal
35. Id. at 1193.
36. Id.
37. In re 7.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
38. See id,
39. Id. at 1191.
40. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See generally LAWRENCE L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
45. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
46. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
19941
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authority for its decision.." At the same time, the Browning court recog-
nized little Florida public policy reflected in Florida constitutional privacy
law.18 Unlike T. W, Browning failed to rely heavily on federal constitu-
tional law and vague national privacy philosophy referring sparingly to some
federal constitutional law such as Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health.49 Some of Browning's procedural requirements for determining
when a surrogate may order the end of life prolonging treatment paralleled
aspects of Cruzan, such as the requirement of clear and convincing evidence
of a patient's wishes.5"
The Browning court, for the most part, avoided relying heavily on
Cruzan or any other federal constitutional law. Instead, the Browning court
utilized a universal or global analysis to determine the privacy rights of
terminally ill patients. This global or universal analysis was intended to
support the application of a state constitutional privacy provision, but more
closely resembled a generalized common law analysis which reviewed a
variety of cases across a spectrum of jurisdictions in order to synthesize a
transcendent set of principles."
The Browning court utilized cases from New York,52 California,53
and a number of other states54 to develop a general theory of Florida
constitutional law. The Browning court even bolstered its common law style
analysis by referring to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.55 Florida
cases were utilized but only in tandem with case law from other states56 or
after the court laid a general policy foundation involving case law from
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
50. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 15; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
51. For more on the common law, see generally JAMES R. STONER, COMMON LAW AND
LIBERAL THEORY (1992); RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN
ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY (1987); ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE
COMMON LAW (1985).
52. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10 (citing Shloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)).
53. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 n.8 (citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct: App. 1986)).
54. Id. at 12 nn.7, 8.
55. Id. at 10.
56. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261, where Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96
(Fla. 1989), and other Florida cases implicating the right to refuse treatment are discussed
either along with, or in the context of, cases from other states.
[Vol. 18
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other states. 7
The T. W. court also utilized Florida law but did so more broadly than
the Browning court. The T W. court surveyed the decisions of Florida cases
that implicated the right to privacy under Florida law.58 However, the
court failed to clarify whether all of the cases mentioned involved the
Florida constitutional right to privacy. For example, Satz v. Perlmutter9
was decided prior to the effective date of the state constitutional privacy
provision.6" Even when the Florida Supreme Court relied on Florida case
law to develop Florida constitutional policy, the court interjected federal
constitutional law.61
The T. W. and Browning opinions supposedly reflected a commitment
by the Florida Supreme Court to a primacy approach to the application of
the Florida Constitution. In T Wi. and Browning, the supreme court looked
to Florida constitutional law as the first source of constitutional protection
for individual rights in Florida. However, the court never followed through
in developing primary Florida constitutional doctrines for the right to choose
an abortion or the right to die. Instead, the court relied on federal constitu-
tional law, national legal policy and philosophy, and an out-of-state based
common law style analysis. This analysis has not only prevented the
Florida Constitution from being the primary protection of individual rights,
but also has effectively relegated the privacy provision to the least important
source of legal protection for individuals.
The half-hearted nature of the primacy model adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court in T. W. and Browning was particularly peculiar given the
context of the state constitutional privacy provision. The Florida Supreme
Court developed Florida constitutional policy for a privacy provision that the
court in T W itself acknowledged was unusual. Only three other state
constitutions contain an express, free standing privacy provision.62 At the
same time, the court found that the Florida constitutional privacy section
provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution,63 and should be
read more expansively than any sections of the Federal Constitution which
57. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12-14, where the court focuses primarily on
Florida cases which have surveyed federal law and laws of other states.
58. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
59. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
60. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192 n.5, 1193.
62. Id. at 1190 n.4.
63. Id. at 1191-92 (citing Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d
544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
1994]
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only implicitly protect privacy.64 It is unclear why the Florida Supreme
Court avoided developing a doctrine based analysis and doctrine based on
an analysis of Florida law and public policy considerations. Such a Florida-
based analysis seems natural for a Florida constitutional provision not found
in many other constitutions, federal or state. By relying in T W and
Browning on federal constitutional policy, national privacy policy and a
common law type analysis based on out of state cases, the Florida Supreme
Court defied the unique nature of the Florida constitutional right to privacy.
The closest the T. W court came to utilizing a Florida policy analysis
was its application of a statute providing that unwed pregnant minors and
unwed mothers may obtain medical care for their fetuses or children without
obtaining permission from an unwed pregnant minor's parents.65 The court
viewed this statute as evidence of Florida's public policy to empower
pregnant minors with the authority to choose treatment for their fetuses or
children. The court found lacking the state's contention that a minor's
procurement of an abortion implicated a compelling state interest, a position
seemingly inconsistent with Florida's public policy of favoring the
empowerment of unwed pregnant minors.6 6 The Florida Supreme Court
in T. W. and Browning in 1989 and 1990 avoided the expansive use of such
a Florida based analysis.
III. THE MATURATION OF THE PRIMACY APPROACH
The Florida Supreme Court in T. W and Browning established a bare
skeleton for a primacy application of the Florida Constitution. The Florida
Supreme Court utilized a two-step approach for analyzing constitutional
issues. First, the court applied the Florida Constitution-the Federal
Constitution would only be applied if the Florida Constitution failed to
provide individual rights protection. In doing so, the court utilized federal
constitutional law, national policy, and a common law analysis based on
non-Florida cases when applying the Florida Constitution, rendering TW.
and Browning primacy cases in name only. In 1992, the Florida Supreme
Court in Traylor v. State67 placed some Florida meat on the primacy
skeleton erected in T. W and Browning.
In Traylor, a convicted murderer complained that police obtained
64. Id. at 1192.
65. Id. at 1195; see FLA. STAT. § 743.065 (1979).
66. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
67. 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
[Vol. 18
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murder confessions in violation of his right to counsel and his right against
self-incrimination.6" The Florida Supreme Court not only decided the
criminal procedure issues against the convicted murderer,69 but also
engaged in an extensive discussion of how the Florida Bill of Rights7" must
be utilized in Florida litigation involving constitutional issues.] As it
explicitly stated in T. W., the Florida Supreme Court declared that the
primacy model of applying a state constitution is now the law in Florida.72
What distinguished Traylor from T. W and Browning was the supreme
court's recognition that the primacy model must be utilized for every phrase
and clause of the Florida Constitution.73 T. W and Browning involved the
Florida constitutional privacy provision-which few other state constitutions
include." Traylor, conversely, involved Florida due process rights,75
rights to counsel and confrontation,76 and the equal protection clause.77
The rights to due process, 8 equal protection,79 confrontation, 0 and
counsel8" also comprise substantial portions of the United States Constitu-
tion's Bill of Rights. Traylor decisively concluded that the primacy model
adopted in T. W and Browning applied to more than just Florida constitu-
tional provisions that differed substantially from the United States Constitu-
tion. After Traylor, the primacy model applies even where the words of
Florida Constitution are similar to those of a federal constitutional provision.
The Traylor court's use of the primacy model differed from the T. W.
and Browning approach in a more significant way. The Traylor court
developed an explicit methodology for construing the Florida Bill of Rights
provisions which require Florida's courts to primarily focus on factors
unique to the Florida state experience.82 The Traylor court never listed
68. Id. at 960.
69. Id. at 970-73.
70. FLA. CONST. art. I.
71. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 961-70.
72. See id. at 962; see also Robert F. Williams, Review Essay: A Generation of Change
in Florida State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 ST. THOMAS U. L. REV. 133, 142-43 (1992).
73. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962-63.
74. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
75. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
76. Id. § 16.
77. Id. § 2.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. Id. amend. VI.
81. Id.
82. Travlor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
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some of the factors which demonstrated the uniqueness of the Florida
experience. Those factors listed were:
1. Express language of the constitutional provision.
2. The formative history of a constitutional provision.
3. Preexisting and developing state law.
4. Evolving customs, traditions, and attitudes within the state.
5. The general history of Florida.
6. External influences that may have shaped state law. 8'
This utilization of factors involving the Florida experience differed
markedly from the court's approach in T. W. and Browning, where the court
utilized at most the last factor listed by the Traylor court (external
influences that may have shaped state law) to the exclusion of all other
factors. The TW. and Browning courts focused exclusively on federal
constitutional, national privacy policy, and non-Florida based common law
analyses.8
The Traylor court rationalized its adoption of a comprehensive primacy
application of the Florida Constitution by providing a federalistic, philosoph-
ical context for its decision. The Florida Supreme Court conceived of state
constitutions in classical textbook federalism terms.85 The court observed
that the federal constitution provides the floor for basic freedoms, while
state constitutions represent the ceiling.86 The federal constitutional floor
allows the United States to find an individual rights common ground or
common denominator, facilitating homogeneity in a pluralistic polity.87
The state constitutional ceiling provides the opportunity for each state to
express a deeper commitment to freedom and individual rights. 88 The state
constitutions allow for flexibility and elasticity unavailable in a constitution
which protects people uniformly throughout the fifty states.89 Because the
states provide a wider spectrum of individual rights opportunities, state
protected individual rights must be the primary rights for Americans,
especially when American govemment is conceived as a limited government
which maximizes individual freedom and minimizes government interfer-
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
85. See William F. Swindler, Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal
Floors and State Ceilings, 49 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1984).
86. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 961.
[Vol. 18
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ence.
90
The court in Traylor remained true to its federalist philosophy and its
own primacy model when it analyzed whether the state had violated the due
process and equal protection rights of the convicted murderer in Traylor.
The Traylor court stayed close to the factors developed by the court to
reflect the unique Florida experience in a Florida constitutional analysis. 9'
The court thoroughly toured Florida legal history to investigate the scope of
Florida confession law utilizing cases from 1853,92 1889, 93 1898, 94 and
19259' in an attempt to explore the common law roots of the law.
Common law principles goveming Florida confession law became subsumed
in 1896 under the Florida constitutional protection against compelled self-
incrimination.96 The Traylor court also focused on the simple and direct
language of the right to counsel provision, recognizing historical contexts
for the Florida language.97 The court looked to historical and modem state
legislation to understand right to counsel policy in Florida, finding such
policy reflected in the right to counsel provision.98 Even court promulgat-
ed rules were utilized by the Traylor court to find evidence of basic Florida
policy reflected in the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution.99
Tray/or provided substance to the application by the T W and
Browning courts of a primacy model for individual protection under the
Florida Constitution. Whether the Traylor court established an enduring and
meaningful primacy role for the Florida Constitution will have to be tested.
IV. PRIMACY AFTER TRAYLOR: JOHN DOE: BACK TO
THE FUTURE OR ON TO THE FUTURE?
The Traylor court mandated that the Florida courts utilize the Florida
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights, in a comprehensive fashion.'
The Florida constitutional analysis model adopted by the Traylor court
90. Id.
91. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962.
92. Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285 (1853).
93. Coffee v. State, 6 So. 493 (Fla. 1889).
94. Green v. State, 24 So. 537 (Fla. 1898).
95. Nickels v. State, 106 So. 479 (Fla. 1925).
96. See Ex parte Senior, 19 So. 652 (Fla. 1896).
97. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 967.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 969.
100. Id. at 962-63.
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included the in-depth utilization of factors that developed the unique Florida
policy interests reflected in and by the Florida Constitution. Five months
after Traylor was decided, the Florida Supreme Court tested its new
commitment to the comprehensive Florida constitutional primacy model
when the court decided Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida Inc. v. Doe.101
Doe involved criminal charges against an alleged prostitute and her
deputy sheriff husband who were charged with prostitution," 2 living off
of the proceeds of prostitution,'0 3 and illegal wiretapping.' °4  As part of
the investigation of the criminal defendants, the police raided the accused's
home, seizing cassette tapes containing recorded telephone conversations,
business cards of alleged customers, and a Rolodex with names and
addresses of customers in it.' °5 When the state decided to disclose the
seized infonnation to the accused in accordance with discovery rules,
individuals, John Does, mentioned or listed in the cassette tapes, business
cards, or Rolodex, moved to deny public access to the pretrial discovery
materials."0 6 The John Does had not been charged with any crimes and
moved to deny public access because criminal investigative information
becomes public information when the state provides requested information
to a defendant."0 7 The John Does lost their fight to keep their names and
addresses from becoming public."°8 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the decisions of the courts below, allowing the names and addresses of the
John Does who did not face criminal charges to become public." 9
The Florida Supreme Court in Doe utilized a primacy approach
focusing almost exclusively on the Florida constitutional right to privacy as
the basis of the individual rights analysis. 1 The court applied some
federal constitutional law principles involving privacy,"' but the court
spent most of its efforts discussing Florida common law principles and
101. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
102. Id. at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 796.07 (1991).
103. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 796.05 (1991).
104. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550; see also FLA. STAT. § 934.03 (1991).
105. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 550.
106. Id.
107. See FLA STAT. § 119.011(3)(c)(5)(1991); Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1988).
108. Doe v. State, 587 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
109. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
110. Id. at 552.
111. Id. at 552-53 n.3.
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Florida public policy considerations." 2 The court's analysis involved
Florida public policy balancing of conflicting interests. The court balanced
the policy impacts of allowing criminal discovery to be utilized by the press
to gather information against the Florida tradition of open records."' The
court expressed concern that allowing the media to utilize criminal discovery
to gather news information could dissuade witnesses and victims from
divulging investigatory information to law enforcement authorities in an
effort to avoid personal information from being publicly disclosed." 4 The
court opted to give the greater weight to legislative policy involving open
records, finding that in camera inspections by trial judges would be
sufficient to protect private information."'
The court utilized its Florida public policy analysis to support its
finding that the names and addresses failed to be protected by the Florida
constitutional right to privacy." 6 The John Doe's privacy rights, at least
in terms of names and addresses, were not implicated when the information
involved their own criminal activity." 7  The Florida Supreme Court
followed the primacy model that the court developed in Traylor, but the
court failed to utilize extensively the factors indicating unique Florida
interests."' Overall, the court's analysis was curt and conclusory, over-
looking factors such as the language of and the formative history of the state
constitutional right to privacy. The court overlooked the following
important indicators of Florida policy:
1. The language of the Florida constitutional privacy provision
states explicitly that the privacy provision "shall not be construed [by the
courts] to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
as provided by law.""' 9 Those words need to be read within the context
of the historical developments of that provision.
2. The legislative history121 for the current privacy provision
placed on the 1980 ballot121 is sparse, but does indicate that the privacy
112. Id. at 552 (citing Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113
(Fla. 1988).
113. Id. at 552-53.
114. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1980).
120. Conference Comm. Rep. on Fla. CS for HJR 386 (1980 Sess.) (on file with
committee)
121. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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provision created a general right to be let alone from government interfer-
ence'22 that is experimental in scope. 23 The privacy provision em-
barked Florida into uncharted territory for privacy protection. The people
of Florida took the opportunity to provide themselves with a broad and
general privacy protection. The Doe court failed to take the broad and
experimental nature of the privacy provision into consideration in its policy
balancing analysis. 24  The court gave preference to public record poli-
cy.125 This was clearly required, given the explicit words in privacy
provision concerning public records. However, the court neglected the
strong privacy concerns implicated in the privacy provision.
3. The court also overlooked formative history of the privacy
provision.'26 The privacy provision was first considered by the 1977-78
Constitutional Revision Commission where concerns about increasing
governmental encroachment on private information were expressed. The
principal aim of the privacy provision was to afford individuals protection
against collection, retention, and use of information about personal
information' 27 The privacy provision reflected the fears of citizens about
potentially abusive powers of the State of Florida to invade and expose
private lives. 28 The Doe court minimized such concerns. Doe involved
the sex lives of individuals not charged with sex crimes. The sensitive
nature of a name, which had been included in a prostitute's records, was
overlooked by the Doe court when it focused on the alleged criminal activity
of the John Does. The court implied that involvement in criminal activity
somehow ended the protection against public exposure, but the court
neglected to recognize that the John Does remained uncharged at the time
of the disclosure. In the context of the early supporters' concerns for a
Florida constitutional privacy provision, such an oversight by the court
122. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Gov'tl Ops. for CS/HJR 387 (Feb. 7, 1980) (on
file with committee).
123. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., CS for HJR 387 (1980) Staff Analysis and
Memorandum from S. Staff to S. President (Oct. 22, 1980) (on file with committee).
124. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 551.
125. Id. at 552.
126. See generally Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right
to Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673 (1978); Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Toward a Right of
Privacy as a AMatterof State ConstitutionalLaw, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 633'(1977); Joseph
S. Jackson, Interpreting Florida's New Constitutional Right of Privacy, 33 U. FLA. L.
REv. 565 (1981).
127. See Rasmussenv. South Fla. Blood Serv. Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987).
128. See, e.g., 1978 Fla. Constitution Revision Comm'n proceedings at 6387, vol. 26
(March 8, 1978) (comments by Commissioner Douglas about 1984 approaching).
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seems odd. The Doe court concluded that the mere appearance of an
individual's name in records of an accused places the individual beyond
Florida constitutional privacy protection."' Such a result runs counter to
earlier concerns by privacy provision supporters about the prevention of a
"1984" govermflental information collection environment, because those
charged with crimes become information collectors for Florida government
on behalf of the media.
4. The Doe court also neglected to read the Florida provision
within the context of policies reflected in other sections of the Florida
Constitution. By allowing the names and addresses of the John Does to be
exposed as public information, the court allowed individuals to be character-
ized through court proceedings as clients of a prostitute. The John Does
would be branded as participating in criminal activity without being afforded
the right to be free of such taint until the state proved wrongdoing. The
formalities involved in the right to due process,"3° confrontation,"' and
counsel 32 remained overlooked by the supreme court as the court viewed
the state right to privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of the primacy model which evolved in T. W., Browning, and
Traylor remains unclear. The Doe court applied the basics of the Traylor
state constitutional interpretive model, but overlooked significant aspects of
the model. The comprehensive nature of the Traylor court's thinking failed
to be reflected in Doe. As the Florida Constitution of 1968 heads toward
its thirtieth anniversary, doubt about the role of the Florida Constitution in
protecting basic human rights of Floridians continues to exist.
129. Doe, 612 So. 2d at 553.
130. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
131. Id. § 16, cl. (a).
132. Id.
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